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Introduction 
The sociological concept of "moral panic" can broadly be 
described as a disproportionate social reaction to a given 
threat or behaviour. The term was first launched over 30 
years ago by Stanley Cohen in his 1972 book Folk Devils 
and Moral Panics, 1 a sociological study of the "Mods and 
Rockers" phenomenon of the mid-1960s. Since then, it has 
been applied to a plethora of social ills, including, but not 
confined to, criminal activity. Well-known examples include 
child abuse," AIDS,3 football hooliganism, rave dances4 and 
various types of drugs,5 as well as certain youth subcultural 
activities6• Indeed, the apocalyptic events of September 11, 
2001 and the massive law enforcement response it 
engendered, have seen the left once again enjoying a brief 
flirtation with the concept. 7 
However, the popularity of the term since the 1990s and 
the increasing tendency to label all kinds of media events 
as "moral panic" have meant that its use has often been 
dogged by ambiguity. It is sometimes used in a pejorative 
sense, sometimes not. Moreover, despite its adoption, thus 
far uncritically, by Irish criminologists 8 the theory of moral 
panic has not been without its critics, who view the concept 
as nothing more than left wing polemic. This article attempts 
a reassessment of moral panic theory. This necessitates, 
first, a review of the literature on the subject and a brief 
history of the term, which will be the focus of the Part One 
of this article. In Part Two, I will endeavour to ascertain the 
current usefulness of the term through a critical examination 
of the main challenges to it. It is submitted that this exercise 
is far from academic in the context of a fearful Irish public 
who have displayed high levels of concern about crime 
since the early 1980s despite comparatively low crime rates 
by international standards. 9 Indeed, suggestions have been 
made by some commentators that Ireland has already 
experienced at least one home-grown moral panic. 10 
A history Of moral panic 
The Origins of the Theory and the Quintessential Moral 
Panic 
Moral panic theory was not conceived in a vacuum. On the 
contrary, it was heavily influenced by the labelling school 
of thought, developed by criminologists such as Lemert 11 
and Becker!" in the 1950s and 1960s. From the labelling 
perspective, deviance is not a quality of the act a person 
commits, but rather a consequence of the application of 
rules. In Becker's famous words, "deviant behaviour is 
behaviour that people so label." 13 Cohen, who was a research 
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student at the University of London in the 1960s, used 
labelling theory and the idea of deviance amplification to 
develop the concept of moral panic. The skirmishes then 
taking place between the Mods and Rockers at certain 
seaside resorts in Britain provided the particular focus for 
his study. He was struck by the fundamentally inappropriate 
reaction of the media, the public and agents of social control 
to these relatively minor disturbances. His definition of moral 
panic has since achieved canonical status through constant 
repetition: 
"Societies appear to be subject, every now and then 
to periods of moral panic. A condition, episode, person 
or group of persons emerges to become defined as a 
threat to societal values and interests; its nature is 
presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by 
the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by 
editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking 
people; socially accredited experts pronounce their 
diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved 
or (more often) resorted to; the condition then 
disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes 
more visible. Sometimes the object of the panic is quite 
novel and at other times it is something which has 
been in existence long enough, but suddenly appears 
in the limelight. Sometimes the panic passes over and 
is forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory; 
at other times it has more serious and long-lasting 
repercussions and might produce such changes as 
those in legal and social policy or even in the way the 
society conceives itself." 14 
One of the most significant features of Cohen's work was 
the linking of the term with that of the "folk devil". In 
Cohen's view, the core attribute of the moral panic is the 
public's identification and demonisation of a particular 
person or group as a scapegoat or folk devil, a morally 
flawed character that is the source of the crisis. Despite the 
use of such terminology, however, Cohen was at pains to 
point out that he did not mean to suggest that the Mods 
and Rockers would not have existed if there had been no 
moral panic, only that their conversion into folk devils was 
an inappropriate solution to the problem. 
Another important element of Cohen's thesis was the 
argument that moral panics are generated by the media and 
by particular interest groups ("moral entrepreneurs") who 
adopt strategic rhetoric in the media to publicise their 
concerns. He focused particularly on the media and their 
role in amplifying the deviance through processes such as 
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symbolisation. Symbolisation is the means by which 
deviants were stripped of their favourable or neutral 
connotations to become in Cohen's words "unambiguously 
unfavourable symbols" or folk devils. These images were 
usually much sharper than the reality. He also used the term 
sensitisation to describe the process whereby the public, 
press and control agents such as the police, in the throes of 
a moral panic, become sensitised to signs of a threat. Indeed, 
it is a form of mild hysteria which " ... transforms an 
ambiguous situation into an absolutely potent generalized 
threat." 15 
As is often the case when a disaster or disturbance 
occurs, a scapegoating process begins and blame is shifted 
upwards in the hierarchy. Cohen referred to this stage in 
the societal reaction as the appeal to the suprastructure. 
This shifting of responsibility to the suprasystem results in 
calls for action and it is at this juncture, with the executive 
under pressure to take some form of action, that legislative 
solutions are most often reached for. At this stage the 
concept of ideological exploitation-the use of the deviant 
to defend or announce an ideology, religious, political or 
otherwise-may become relevant. Politicians or interest 
groups can use events to justify previously held positions 
or to promote novel solutions to the problem. The 
introduction of new methods of control so as to stretch 
existing institutional limits was termed by Cohen as 
innovation, for example, legislation providing for increased 
police powers or tougher penalties. 
Notably, while Cohen viewed the Mods and Rockers 
panic as being bound up with societal concerns over the 
post-war affluence and sexual freedom they represented, 
he appeared to view the concept as historically timeless. In 
Folk Devils he concludes, "More moral panics will be 
generated and other, as yet nameless, folk devils will be 
created." 16 
Consolidation and extension: moral panic gets political 
Cohen's remarks have proved prophetic. Since the author's 
original formulation, scholars have fleshed out the concept 
in applying it to other social problems. Of particular 
significance is the work of Stuart Hall et al. 17 on the British 
mugging panic of 1972-1973. Hallet al. quoted Cohen's 
definition of moral panic with approval, noting that the 
mugging panic fitted squarely within it, "in almost every 
detail." However, they went on to formulate their own 
generalised definition of the theory, which, crucially, made 
explicit the idea of a disproportionate response. While this 
was implicit in Folk Devils, Hallet al. put the matter beyond 
doubt, describing the phenomenon as "when the official 
reaction to a person, group of persons or series of events is 
out of all proportion to the actual threat offered" and "when 
the media representations universally stress 'sudden and 
dramatic' increases and 'novelty' above and beyond that 
which a sober, realistic appraisal could sustain" .18 
This was not, however, the only difference between the 
two texts. While Cohen adopted a studied neutrality 
throughout his work, Hall et al. perceive moral panic as a 
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political phenomenon, generated, whether deliberately or 
unconsciously, through political activity. 19 The authors' 
central thesis borrowed from Marxist, or more correctly 
Gramscian, terminology in alleging that post-war Britain was 
experiencing a "crisis ofhegemony" or a breakdown in the 
ruling of the State. This crisis necessitated a shift from the 
pole of consensus, or ruling by agreement, to that of 
coercion. The mugging panic therefore formed part of the 
orchestration of an authoritarian consensus in support of 
coercive measures and in Hallet al. swords was "one ofthe 
principal forms of ideological consciousness by means of 
which a silent majority is won over to the support of 
increasingly coercive measures on the part of the State and 
lends its legitimacy to a more than usual exercise of 
control."20 
Hall et al. 's work is by its very nature extremely 
contentious and has come in for much criticism. Chief among 
his critics is Cohen, who highlights his failure to outline 
sufficiently the contours of the moral panic on mugging 
itself. 21 This is a valid criticism. The first chapters of the 
book, in which the panic is detailed, fail to entirely convince, 
and in particular the public reaction to the mugging threat 
is not sufficiently relayed. One is left with the impression 
that the mugging panic itself may have been neglected in 
favour of the central thesis of the "crisis in hegemony". In 
the view of this writer, the primary value of the work for this 
study is probably the clear links forged by the authors 
between the concept of moral panic and the idea of 
proportionality, which are .central to the notion of moral 
panic as an empirical, as opposed to a polemical, concept. 
Development of the theory: from hegemony to hooligans 
Engaging directly with the law and order rhetoric of 
Thatcherism, Geoffrey Pearson's book, Hooligan: A History 
of Respectable Fears, 22 challenged head-on the assertion 
that there had been an increase in violence in the previous 
"twenty or thirty years" or "since the war", characterising 
it as the nostalgic yearning for a bygone "golden age". He 
did this by colourfully exposing society's age-old 
propensity to panic over certain forms of "deviance" as a 
form of ideological cohesion, or "moral dodo ism". By tracing 
the reactions to the various "hooligans"23 of the ages, from 
the Teddy Boys to the original Victorian hooligan, right 
back to the unruly apprentices of pre-industrial "Merrie" 
England, Pearson adds historical depth to the concept of 
moral panic. Through the familiar pattern that he paints, 
Pearson's historical canvas provides the strongest possible 
support for Cohen's contention that "[s]ocieties appear to 
be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic."24 
The phenomenon of moral panic, while perhaps first 
"discovered" by Stanley Cohen in 1972, is nearly as old as 
deviance itself. To borrow Pearson's ornithological 
metaphor, the dodo had been on the rampage for many 
centuries before Cohen adopted the role of taxonomist. 
The most recent attempt to develop the theory has been 
by two American sociologists, Goode and Ben-Yehuda, in 
their 1994 book Moral Panic: The Social Construction of 
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Deviance. "5 Of particular interest is their attempt to construct 
a more unified theory of moral panic. Having reviewed both 
English and American literature on moral panic, the authors 
suggest five crucial elements or criteria which together 
"spell out a more or Jess definable measurable social 
phenomenon.""6 There should be a high level of concern 
over the behaviour of a certain group or category of people; 
widespread consensus that the problem is serious; and an 
increased level of hostility toward the group or category. 
Moral panics are also likely to be volatile, in that they appear 
suddenly and are short lived and, importantly, the public 
reaction is disproportionate or more substantial than is 
warranted by a realistic appraisal of the situationY 
While obviously not definitive nor exhaustive, these 
criteria provide an extremely useful guide to the 
phenomenon. Further, over and above any of the works 
previously mentioned, Goode and Ben-Yehuda cultivate an 
awareness throughout their study that the concept of moral 
panic is inextricably linked with questions oflegal control. 
In a chapter entitled "[ d]eviance, moral entrepreneurs and 
the criminal law" ,"8 they note, "no examination of moral panic 
is complete without a consideration of legislation and law 
enforcement ... Whenever the question 'what is to be done?' 
is asked, then almost inevitably there follows the response 
'there ought to be a law. "'29 The authors term this process 
whereby the panic is transformed into more lasting 
organisational structures the routinisation or the 
institutionalisation of a moral panic, citing as an example 
"the periodic drug panics that have washed over American 
society for over a century which continue to deposit 
institutional sediment in their wake". 30 In structuring their 
work thus, the authors serve to highlight the importance of 
the concept as a focus for research. Moral panics are not 
like fads, which disappear without a trace. They are key in 
bringing about change. 
Moral panic comes of age: recent applications of the concept 
The concept of moral panic has to some extent been hoisted 
on the petard of its own success. As Ungar31 notes in his 
2001 article, there is "a lack of agreement about what is 
happening with moral panics. McRobbie and Thornton 
( 1995) argue that panics are harder to constitute than they 
once were. In contrast, Thompson ( 1998) refers to the 
"increasing rapidity in the succession of moral panics" and 
"the all-pervasive quality of panics that distinguish the 
current era." This confusion can to some extent be attributed 
to the prostitution of the concept which has occurred in the 
mass media, particularly since 1993. 
Moral panic was thrust onto the public stage with the 
panic over the murder of James Bulger and juvenile crime 
that unfolded in 1993. The ensuing politico-media debate, 
which centred around juvenile delinquency and broader 
issues such as immorality and family breakdown, caused 
the term "moral panic" to officially enter the mainstream 
press. 32 Ironically, this was largely due to the media co-
opting the term in order to question its own culpability in 
the generation of outbreaks of panic, engendering the first 
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reflexive moral panic.33 It has now been observed that "[it] 
has become a standard interview question to put to 
Conservative MPs: are they not whipping up a moral panic 
as a foil to deflect attention away from more pressing 
economic issues?"34 The popularity of the term, however, 
has also lead some writers to examine it more critically. Hunt35 
has noted that, as well as employing the concept in a 
traditional pejorative sense, it has also been rather 
ingeniously invoked in aid by the right-wing press who 
have sought to endorse it, justifying it as rational. Further, 
the term is often used by journalists to signify mere moral 
indignation, without thought being given to its hidden 
implications. 
In more recent times the theory of moral panic has been 
applied in the analysis of the social reaction to a variety of 
social problems. Of all these, however, perhaps the moral 
panic over the murder of James Bulger merits particular 
attention. It is submitted that it illustrates that the concept 
is every bit as relevant to the media and interest groups 
today as it was to the Mods and Rockers in 1964. 
The trial of the two boys accused of the murder took 
place in November 1993 and attracted massive media interest. 
The tone of most of this was harshly punitive but also 
contradictory. Despite a general recognition that the case 
was highly unusual in its features, it was viewed as 
representative of a broader malaise concerning youth and 
youth justice. This terrible, but rare, event became confused 
with juvenile offending in general and wider issues about 
the family. As Newburn36 notes, "[tlhe Bulger case was the 
'flashpoint' which ignited a new moral panic and led to 
further demonization of young people and, increasingly in 
the 1990s, also of lone mothers who were increasing in 
number and, in right-wing underclass theory (Murray, 1990), 
were perceived to be a key part ofthe 'problem' :m 
One significant effect of the coverage was to persuade 
the Home Secretary to increase the sentence on the young 
murderers from 10 to 15 years. The Home Office justified its 
decision on the basis that there was "evidence of public 
concern", citing a 20,000 signature petition organised by 
The Sun newspaper.38 Pressure groups also played a role in 
using the heightened sense of risk to press for their 
predetermined objective. Foil owing a reference by the judge 
in the Bulger trial to a horror film that one of the offenders 
might have watched, a campaign was launched, spearheaded 
by Liberal MP David Alton, to put down an amendment to 
the Criminal Justice Public Order Bill to further restrict access 
to video films. David Alton was a leader of a lobby group 
called the Movement for Christian Democracy (MCD) which 
had consistently campaigned for increased film and video 
censorship. This amendment was subsequently passed and 
the Home Secretary also announced plans for more 
custodial sentences for young offenders. 
Home grown moral panic 
Nor has Irish society remained impervious to the 
phenomenon. Both O'Connell 39 and O'Mahony40 have 
alleged a moral panic among the Irish public who, despite 
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relatively low crime rates by international standards, 
continue to register high levels of concern over crime. 
Interestingly, many commentators have advanced the view 
that the concept may have particular application to the 
period of heightened concern over crime witnessed in the 
wake of the murder of journalist Veronica Guerin in the 
summer of 1996. Carey41 has suggested that, "the concept 
of moral panic cannot be understated in respect of the 
legislative response to the Guerin and McCabe murders 
which ultimately culminated in the infamous 'Summer Crime 
Package' of Summer 1996."42 Criminologists O'Donnell and 
O'Sullivan43 are unequivocal in their description of the 
public outrage which followed the murder of Ms. Guerin as 
"a textbook case of moral panic". 44 
The most systematic application of the concept in an 
Irish context, however, has been carried out by John Meade. 
Meade has suggested the phenomenon of moral panic as a 
possible explanation of the legislative history of the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 1996.45 This Act, which formed part 
ofthe above-mentioned "Summer Crime Package", effected 
a fundamental change in our system of law enforcement 
through the introduction of the American concept of civil 
forfeiture. Meade examined the work of both Cohen and 
Hall eta!. with a view to explaining how such a seismic shift 
came to receive such unqualified support, both in the 
Oireachtas and among the Irish public. He noted the dramatic 
language employed by the politicians at the time--evoking 
images of AI Capone and the prohibitionist era-as well as 
the sheer speed of the legislative response. The Proceeds 
of Crime Act had been introduced within a week of the 
Guerin murder and had been enacted within the space of 
five weeks. Moreover, the Act was introduced as a Private 
Member's Bill, thereby bypassing the important drafting 
process. 
Meade took issue with the frequent use of the term 
"organized crime" during the period, both in the press and 
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in the Oireachtas, thereby importing into the public imagery 
the range of ideas and fears associated with the American 
and Italian organised crime networks.46 Indeed, he drew an 
analogy between the use of this phrase in Ireland and the 
classification of various acts of street violence as "mugging" 
in 1970s Britain which Hallet al. claimed had an amplificatory 
effect on the public's perception of the crime. The writer 
also convincingly applied Cohen's concepts of"innovation" 
and "ideological exploitation" to the situation, suggesting 
that politicians used the opportunity presented by the 
successive murders ofVeronica Guerin and Gerry McCabe 
to introduce the Proceeds of Crime Act as an innovatory 
piece of legislation. The new atmosphere of outrage and 
fear operated so as to provide a platform from which 
politicians could easily launch the innovatory concepts 
contained within the new legislation. He suggested that 
Cohen's concept of "sensitization" may also have been in 
evidence: "the media's use of sensational headlines and 
melodramatic vocabulary coupled with the rhetoric of the 
parliamentarians ensured a public discourse through which 
a process of sensitization took place."47 
Having entered the caveat that he was not attempting a 
definitive explanation ofthe sociological processes behind 
the enactment ofthe 1996 Act, Meade concludes: 
"It might well be argued then, that the actions of 
legislature in altering fundamentally the process by 
which proceeds of crime may be seized, allegedly based 
upon a belief that organised crime was about to 
overrun the country, may have been somewhat 
disproportionate to the actual threat posed."48 
Meade's work serves to illustrate that the sociological 
domain carved out by moral panic may still provide important 
insights into our legislative processes today. This 
assumption will tested in Part Two of this paper through an 
examination of the main critiques of the concept. 
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